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COURTELL 1'

l\Icl~ACHEN

the <·otwlu1'ion that the
informer either did not <:xisl
or was not reliable. Obviouc;l.v,
defemhmi sn<·eeedr~<l.
at
in r::reating a eontliet i11 the evidenr·c for the trial r:ouri
to
and the eourt was entitled to belieYf' Xoel and to
determine that the comnnmieation in question was in faei
made by an informer known to Noel as ,James Allen and that,
in view of the informer past reliability, there was reasonabl(•
r:ause for the arrest and search.
\Vhat has been said above makes it nnneeessary to eonsider
defe11daut 's claim that the information allegedly giv<~ll by
Handolph Clark eannot be relied upon to justify the seareh
and seiznre beeause Noel learned of it indirectly through lnspedor Ohlson, who did not testify.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Carter, ,J., Traynor,
an<l ~\]f.('omb, .J., <oOIH·urred.

[L. A. :\o. 34383.

.J., Sehauer, ,J., Spenee, .J.,

In Bank.

Feb. 2, 1959.]

])0:'\\'A .JEAN COUH'l'ELL, a Minor, ete., Hespondent, v.
HAZ~JL

lVL .l\IcEACilEN et al., Appellants.

[la, lb] Negligence-- Instructions-Contributory Negligence-Infants.--Jn an action for injuries sustained by a 5-year ami
9-month-old girl when her elothing took fire allegPdly from live
embers of a fire left unattended on defendants' lot, an instruetion given by the court on its own motion that thrre was no
contributory nPgligence on plaintiff's part erroneously deprived
defendants of a defense on which they relied, where it was not
warrantPd on Hll)' of the following theories: (1) that a child
of plaintiff's age is conclusivPly presumPd to be incapable of
contributory negligence; (:J) that the cviden<'e established that
the partieular plaintiff was incapable of negligPnce with respect to the accideut in question: (3) that it was proved as a
matter of law that plaintiff, while cnpable of negligenec, had
exercised due earp; or ( 4) that, although plaintiff had been
negligent, lwr laek of care eould not havf) contt'ihutNl to her
injmy.
McK. Dig. References:
Negligence, § 310; [2-4] Negligence,
32;
Negligence,~ 170; [6] Negligenre, § 246; [7] Independent
Contractors, §§ 14, 34;
Master and Servant, ~ 206; [9] Independent Contractors, 833; [10-12] K egligenee, ~ 80; [13] Pires,
§ 11; [14] X rglig<'neP, § 91; [liJ, 16] Pires, § 1; [17] K egligcnce, § 93.
~

]

!d.-Care by
eare to nvoid thf'
(•oeouutered :uHl
it fnilf'd til
due <·an',
eontt·ihnting: to th(c
M'P nonnnlly for the t;·iH of fn,·t io determine.

[3]
is not ns n matter·

Ol'

la 11·

Id.-Care by Infant.s.-In an uetion for
nnd 9-JtwntlHJld gi d wlleu
took fit·t·
frolll live embers of n f\re let't unattell(!l'd ou deCciHi ..
ants'
-where tJH~ evid<'Het~ ·was
hrr dre~s (·au;.;·ht. ilre because ~he
tPstimony that another lire lwd been

as to 1\'ltdht·r
f1nnH!:1 (Lhel'e
children

on the
or beenww she
embers, a deterlllin:ttion of this conflict \Yas
to esereise enn-: i'o1·
to resolve
o[ the girl's
nnd thu,;e ques ..
her
aud of her coutrihutory
tions could not properly be deeided as nwtters of law.
[5] !d.-Questions of I,aw and Fact-Contributory Negligence.Coutributory negligenee bears directly on the outemne ot
suit, and where the facts are in dispute there is no ratiomd
hnsis for permitting the judge, rather than the jury, to resolve
that matter.
[6] Id.-Appeal- Reversible Error- Instructions-Contributory
Negligence.-·-In an action for injuries sustained hy a :J-yeur
and 9-month-old girl when her clothing took fire
from
live e!ll hers of a ilre left unattenrlel[ on defendnnts' lot, the
c·ourt on nppeal rould not disrPganl the effect of an enollPOHS
instrudion given by the conrt on ib own motion that therP
was 110 eontrilmtory l!Pgligenz-e, altll'mgh it was
tlwt this dcfen:e was so defeetively
that
treated as not propPrly in the ease, where
evidenrr to show t!wt she was not guilty
gen,;t•, 1d1ere both
H''luested iw,tnwtimJs on tlw j,.,JH',
:md where there wns nothing to sholl' that the ,jpfed in the
pleadings misled or hindered plaintiff in nny wa.v.
(7] Independent Contractors-Existence of Rela~tionship.---Tn an
ad ion for injuries sustainPd by a G-year D!Hl 9 .nwnth-ol1l girl
when her elothing took fire allegedly frow live ember:; of a fin•
lei't mwttPJHtPd on defem!nnts' lot. whether a tenant on an
adjoining Jot
by defccnd:mts to do the
was au
independent eontraetor or nn ewployee was a
of faet
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d,
~ 7fJ; Am.Jur.,
§ 201
et seq.
Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Tndepell(lent Contraetor~, ~ 4 et seq.; Am.
Jur., fndt>pendent ContnH:tors, § G et sPq.
51 C.2d-15

re~'nrding

[9] Independent

due
n'.
of Employer. --The TUle
linhi(• for an independ<•nt eont1·netor's
situa-

Contractors--~Liabil.ity

tions ·where nn
whid1 the
ho(\il~- iwrm to others
re t:I ken. Thn Plll]lloyf'l' is liable
the nh~c'atc o!' sm·li prei'uutions if

to cl:<f-;ure ohS( 1'Y<HltP of the prehe has
rautinns, eithet
in the eoHtrad or in some other
rea~onahle Huumer, or· ii' the
contrartor has not
l~XPn:iscd reasonable care to tnko ~uth
[10}' Negligence-Care Toward Infants.~-.\ ehild trPspasser mhy a eondition of the
Jtw~· recover if the ease
comes within ihe rule that n posoc:~soi' of land is suhject to
liability fnr bo<lily harm to
ehildreu irP:<.p<i~,;ing thereon
cnus(;d by
stmcture or othPr nrtineial condition whif'h he
mainbius on the
if the phcc v:lien; the ('O!Hlition is
1r1niutained is oue (!U whjeh tl1e
m· should
lmow that
childn:n are
and the condition is one of which tl>c possessor kncnv,, or should know and
whieh he
or should n:alil:c as
um·easonahle
harm Lo slH:h
and
of
tion or rt.}alize the risk involved
com
~within the nren made
to the possPssor of
as
lS
to the risk to children.
[11] Id.-Care Toward Infants.--The
possessor of land
toward
children extends to
conditions which,
1

§ 20; Am.Jur.,

Feb.

CouRTELL

v.

McEAOHEN

451

to young ehildren would

of Law and

[13]

Fact.~In

an

evidence thnt a. tPnant on nn
burning did some
in the center of defendants' lot on
the morning of the
at about 11 a. m. to return
to his home after (::1eeordin;?: to his
he put out the
fire with a
came on the lot ubout 8:30 p. m.
on the im·itntion ot the temmt's
that the fire wns still
that another .fire had
been started near the front of the lot by the tenant's son, and
that the
·with this
a factual issue was presented
county ordinance
it
unlawful to leave an outdoor or open fire unattended unless lw
should thoroughly
it in sueh manner as to prevent
hut the violation of another ordinance
the burning uule~s the person
so first secures a permit,
does the
between 6 and 10 a. m., or does the burning
within an established camp site could be showu as a math!r of
law where none o£ these
would be

[14] Negligence-Violation of Statute-Rebuttal of Presumption.
-IV here a statute is intended to
the class of persons
in which

the
of tl1e type of
the stntute
rise to
may be rebutted
eviordinances
an open fire unattended wit11out first
it and Jlrohibiting such burning nn-
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it procures a
and
hours, or the burning takes
established camp site were
the
of fire
from fires not

[51 C.2d
does the
place within the
intended to probut
all

the possessor
[16] Id.-Statutes and Ordinances.--The person who is
for the burning of an open fire is
by county ordinances
nn!avYful
the fire unattended without thorit and to do the burning without a permit
certain hours. with
that unreasonable
harm are pres~nted by the
to be prevented, including dangers to trespassing childnm
from conditions not obvious to them, and a
violation of the ordinances would, absent a
of
cation or excnse,
rise to a presumption of m•gligence if
the
were to find against defendants on the questions
,..,.,,.,.u11w existence of concealed risk and knowledge of use of
defendants' lot (on which the burning was done) by children.
[17] Negligence- Violation of Statutes or Ordinances.
In an
action for
sustained by a 5-yenr and 9-month-old girl
when her
took fire allegedly from live embers of a fire
left unattended on defendants' lot, a presumption of negligence
from burning, by the person engaged to do it,
in violation of county ordinances could not form a basis of
liability unless the violation proximately caused plaintiff's
and there would be a question in this connection as to
whether the accident resulted from the fire started by the
person
to do the burning or a second fire assertedly
by his son.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Frederick F. Houser, ,Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for burns sustained by a girl whose
fire allegedly from live embers of a fire left
unattended on defendants' lot. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
l'vfnrehison &
D. Allen for Appellants.

R. Bruce Murchison and Warren

and the adin the amount of:
fot" severe burns :;;he ;.:ustained while
owned hy the l\1eEaehens in
A house had been torn down on the lot \Yhrre
and early in 1953 1\Ir.
the rral property of the
burn the lumber and
whieh c.overed the lot. Plummer,
an
worker in a tire
, was
tenant of
the M(·Eaehens,
a house n0xt to thr lot. aml h(•
to do tlw burning for on0 mm1th's free rent. MeEm·hrn told
him that he could burn a little raeb
between 9 :00 a. m. and
] 0 :30 or 11 :00 a. m., and for several
Jst he lmnwd some debris at
the l'l'ntrr of
1he lot. On February ]] , the
of the
Plummer
did some burning in this mannrr and left the lot about 11 :00
a.m., returning to his home.
About 2::30 p. m. on J<'rhruary 11,
a
5 years
and 9 months old, was walking home from school. Srveml
ehildren, among them two daughters and a son of Plummer,
were playing on the lot, and one of them called to plaintiff to
join them. A woman ·who saw the accident from her home
nearby testified that plaintiff walked to the center of the
Jot, jumped oyer ~:>omcthing and "
dowu" and that,
when plaintiff got up, the bade of her drrss was on fire. The
witness had observed the lot from the time that Plummer
started the fin· in the morJJing, and she stateu that, when the
accident happenc>d, the fire was still
although
there were no flames.
The court determined that plaintiff >nts capable of being a
witness, and she testified that her dress caught fire when,
having gone to the center of the lot and having jumped over
a pile of wood, she squatted do·wn to pick up a stiek. She
further said that there were no flames on the lot, that there
was a little smoke in the eenter and embers on the ground,
including a 6-inch pile under some wood, that she did not
know embers eould burn her or set her dress on fire, and that
she knew of fire only from her mother's stove.
Aceording to one of Plummer's daughters, her brother had
started a fire near the front of the lot, and, when plaintiff
came onto the lot, the children were playing with that fire,
which was about 15 inehes high. Both plaintiff and the wit-

''red eoals.''

that children
to the
was shown
a statement to the conirnr.v in her
to Plnmmcr,
knew that hie:; c:hilc1rcn and
on
lot af'H'l' the house had been torn down,
M"Eaclwn had Yisited him on some oceasiom; when
the dJildrc:a
there.
Defendants iir:-;t
of an instrndion
by
the L:OlEt on its mva
that there \\'as uo contributory
'l'lwrc are four theories
an instruetion: (1)
presumed to
that the: evidence
of such
with respect to
ion; (3) that
us a matter of law, that
had excreised due: care; or
although
had been
her lad' of c·are could not have
nry. None of the;;e
of the instrnl'iion in this case.
\Ylwther a r:hild wafi
ol' exercistile
eneoUJ1 tercel and
due tare, thereby
for the triPr of faet
io detcrmiue.
167 Cal.
J
J:W l1:l8 P. 712] .)
(•ourts have l'l'
the
, hciiYCl'll fin' ancl
as a maHer of Jaw.
v.
, 8"1 CaL\pp.
2d 361, 370
P.2d
; Carrillo v. Helms Bakeries, Ltd.,
6 Cnl.App.2d
304
P.2d
.) [4] 'l'he cYidPnee
was eonfiicting as to ·whether plaintiff";; dress eanght :fire
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be~:am;e

she

Oll

a
dis<.:rction of trial
to refer
to
the
as to whether the
negligence of children of the
of
years or under
sueh as
to preveut tbPir reeoYery . . . . " In that ease, howeyer, the
trial
had llOt dec·ided the iswe of
negligence but had submitted it to the
the c.asc on its
facts docs not support
and the quoted
language should not be eonsi rued in the manner
[5]
is a matter bearing directly
Wl in the present case,
there is no rational basis for permitting the
rather than the jur;r, to resolve that matter.
So far as has bPeu called to our
the exisknco of
such an

[lb]
gence on tbe part of
of a defem;o upon whieh
tiff has not raised tho
error is not prejudicial
defense ·was
so c1efectively
that it must Le treated as not
in the case. Ho\Yever, tlwre is
in the record to sbow,
and
tiff dors not no\v
that tlle defect in the

and she introrhwcd
been matn·ial to her

ory
no flamt'S on the
that
kttow enthPrs l'Otll<l
bet·
set lll'r dresc: on
and that
she kllew of fire
from her mother's :;;toYe. On appeal she
has not sPen fit io ltWntion the dc•fec·t and argnPs only that the

ilwt there

C.2d

must be rewhich should be discussed

'l'hc determination
contractor or an
of various factors,
the most
of which is the
of control retained
the MeEaehens.
Star 2vlincs Co. v. California
Com., 28 CaL2J
43-44 [168 P.2d 686].) 'fhe evidence now before us is inconclusive in regard to this factor
since it appears that McEachcn gave only a few instructions
and did not
the burning but that Plummer would
additional instruetions had
been given.
eircumstances are also conflicting in their
Plummer was paid by the job, rather than
but burning was not his usual oeeupation. On
the
as to whether Plummer was an
or an iudepemlent contractor is one of fact.
[8] Obviously, if Plummer was an employee, defendants
'nmld be liable for any conduct on his part which, in view
of his
use of the lot by children, would
eonstitute a lack of due care. \Ye do not mean to suggest,
hmYever, that there could be no liability if it should be found
that Plummer was in independent contractor. [9] The rule
that an
is not liable for an independent contractor's
negligence is subject to numerous exceptions, including the
ones set forth in seetions 418 and 416 of the Restatement of
'roris.
v. Empt·css Theatre Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 4,
·>section 413 of the Restatement of Torts provides:
''One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the
should recognize as
creating dnring its progress,
cu11wucmo containing an unreasonable
of bodily harm to others unless
arc taken, is
to liability for bodily harm
them by tile abscnee of
precautions; if the employer (a)
in the contract that
contractor shall take snch precantions
to which see § 416), or
fails to exercise reasonable care
to provide in some other manner for
taking of such precautions.''
Section 416 of the Restatement of Torts provides:
nn independent contractor to do work, which the
recognize as necessarily requiring the creation during

457
v. Sonthern Cal. Edison
P.2d 912]; llnell v.
39 Cal.2d
) Those sections relate to a situation
to do work
eondition
others

precautions are taken.
the
for an injury caused
preeautions if he has failed to take steps to
oh~crvauee of the precautions, either
a proVIsiOn in
the contract or in some other reasonable manner (§ 413), or
if the
eontraetor has not exercised reasonable care
(§ 416). It is to be noted that the
sections
the existence of a risk to others, so that a showing of such
must be made regardless of what the independent
eontraetor may have known.
Another question is whether plaintiff, who undoubtedly has
a cause of action if she was injured by active operations and
·was a licensee
v. Stewart, 24 CaL2d 133, 136
156 A.I.1.R. 1221]; Rest., Torts, § 341), has no
[148 P.2d
eause of aetion if she was injured by a condition of the premises and was a trespasser. [10] A child trespasser injured by
a condition of the premises may recover if the case eomes
within the rule set forth in section 339 of the Restatement
of
and, of course, a child licensee thus injured has
at least an equal right of recovery
Prosser on 'rorts (2d
e>d. 1955) pp. 450, 438-440; Rest., Torts, § 342 and comment
(b)
Section 339 reads: ''A possessor of land is
to liability for bodily harm to young children trcsthereou caused by a structure or other artifieial condition vvhieh he maintains upon the land, if (a) the place where
the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor
knovvs or should know that such children are likely to trespass,
and (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or
should lmow and which he realizes or should realize as inan unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm
to sueh
and (c) the children because of their youth
do not discover the eondition or realize the risk involved in
in it or in coming within the area made dangerits progress of a condition involving a peculiar risk of bodily harm to
otllns nnkss speci:ll prceantions un' tak<'H, is snlljert to liability for
bodily lmnn eaused to tLcm hy the f:1ilure of tlJC <'Ontractor to exercise
n:asonn b!e care to take such precautions.''

oi (·hil<leeu."
However,
does not extend to ''those condi lions Ihe
of whieh is ohvions even io ehildren and the risk o
realized
them."
.,
§
L:Olllmcnt
.)
[12] Ou the basis of the rcc:onlnow before us, different inferences could he drawn
to the ehanwtcr of
eneountered
and it ·would he for the trier of fact
to determine whether she \Yas
a risk not obvious
to her. 'l'he
·whether the concealed
if it
should han; hceu
au unreason-

Yiew of
two eounty fire ordinances
rstablish defendants'
Seetion 1813 of Ordinauce No. 2947
"It shall
be unlawful to
or eause or
to be
any outdoor
or opeu fire unattended by an adult person, or such person
or persons as may be requin'd in
issnec1 for any sueh
fire by the County Fire \Varden.
any sud1
fire, sueh person or per;,ons in
onghly
fmme by
it with
satut'at ing it with water, or
it in sneh a
manner to preyent
of sneh fire.''
Section 1301 of Onlinan(·e No.
whieh also relates
to open
that a person slw.ll not
or eanse
or permit to be
any eomlmstible matP1·ial unless
be first seeurcs a 1wrmit to do so, or (h) the
is done
in Rmall
bc'h\·een 6 :00 a. m. and 10 :00
lmi
or otllee eomlmstiblc madistmH·es from
terial, and is attended at aU times
an adult
gnishing
, or (e) the
takes
bountlaries of an est a bliRhed eamp site.'~
·'Sec·tion 1301 o[ Orrl innncc ::\ o ..!;>~0 provldes:
'• Open J;':ircs·-~-Lonrs of
shall 11ot huil<l, light,
tnlu, or cau8z~ OT pennit to l~e
or nudntainell, nny open or
outdoor :fire, use, or tatlSC' or p~·rmit
nscd, any fire for eleal'i11g ]an(1,
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arca of
O!ll~
a trespasser. It may
hO'-H'VN', that the
of Ordinanee No. 5520
to issuance of permits
for open fires makes dear that the fire ~warden is to consider
of the
of fire ''or·' the proteetion

that
arise fro1n
is0s where

the reasonable construction to be
not only
all
eontrollcd or extinou the premis clone.
undoubtedly

lmrn or
to ],c hnrned, any
{lr other
c·on1lrustihlc materint
"(a)
secnres from the County ]'ire
Fnitl'<l States J•'orcst Sorviec of\\cer having """'~''H'"

so to
is in one or 1noTo snudl heaps or
·where the
or plowed
any \YOOclbnd,
or other J1nmmahle
in :u•tnal nttendanee

is within the boundaries of any established camp
l:llG.''
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extends to licensees on those
and there is no reason
to conclude that it does not also extend to child trespassers to
\Yhom a
of care is owed undrr the rule set forth in
339 of the Restatement of rrorts. [16] The perSOll
Pvu;,un.co for the
lS
the ordinancrs

existence of a concealed risk and
of use of the lot by children.
[17] 1\.
of negligence arising from
Plummer in violation of the ordinances could not form a basis
of liability, of course, unless the violation
caused
plaintiff's injuries. There would be a
in this connection as to whether the accident resulted from the fire started
Plummer or a second fire assertedly lighted
his son.
The judgment is reversed.
and Traynor, J., concurred.
SPENCE, ,J., Coneurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the
reversal of the judgment upon the principal
stated
for reversal in the main opinion. It is there
that '' 'l'he instruction that there \Vas no
negligence erroneously deprived ch~fendants of a defense upon
which
had relied .... In these
we are not
justified in disregarding the effect of the erroHeous instruction, and, since the error was dearly
to
the judgment must be reversed.''
from the vicvvs expressed in the main opinion upon the more
fundamental questions involved on this
Furthermore, I am of the opinion that the reversal should be accompanied with directions to the trial c·ourt to enter
in
favor of defendants.
'rhis is one of a series of re<:\'JJt
the question of the nature of the duty owed by the landowner to the
child. My views on this
at some length in my dissenting
Willson,
pp. 94, 106 [:331 P.2d
repeated here. But
of the
views
in the Reyllolds
dear that

461
obvious risk of
dJild

other children or
contact
bu~lt in the middle of tlw
It may also be conceded that concould be drawn as to whether Plummer
or an independellt contractor. But even if
inferences are resolved in favor of
of liability here appears to be wholly inconw·hieh
limit the type
may be imposed upon the landowner
child.
's tPstimouy, it showed that while she
"she saw "live embers" and "smoke''
th0refrom. Her explanation of her rash aet in squatdown there was that she had nrver seen "live embers"
beforr. 'l'hc fact remains, however, that any ritik whieh she
encountered was a common, obvious risk of fire. To intimate,
as does the main opinion, that the risk described by plaintiff
could be found
the trier of fact to be a ''concealed''
or a '' hidr!eu' or'' masked'' risk as required by the authorities,
to
in a c·ontradiction of terms. No risk can be more
eommon or more obvious than the risk presentrd by the orclinary trash fire built upon the surface of the ground. Such was
the
risk
here under any view of the evidenee.
to note that the main opinion does not
case whieh has imposed liability upon the landowner to the trespassing ehild under similar cireumstanees.
On the other hand, the great weight of authority supports
the view that no liability should be imposed here. (Moon v.
97 Cal.App.2d 717 [218 P.2d 550] ; Dunbar v. OliL·ieri,
97 Colo. 381
P.2d 64]; Paolino v. McXendall, 24 R.I. 432
1L
96 Am.St.Hep. 786, 60 hRA. 133]; Fitzmaurice
v. Connccticul R. & L. Co., 78 Conn. 406 [62 £1. 620, 112 Am.
159, 3 L.RA. N.S. 149] ; Ame1~ican Advertising &
Bill Posting Co. v. Flannigan, 100 Ill.App. 452; Erickson v.
Oreal Northern Ry.
82 Miun. 60 [84 N.W. 462, 83 Am.
410, i51 L.RA. 645]; Coleman v. Robert Graves Co., 39

192; 27 A.L.R2c1 1!87,
Some of the
fire
as well
ot hrr cases,
involved violations of ordinances but such violations
deemed material
the
like the
were
ehildren. As
ing to
insofar as the
concerned.''
'rhc main
does not discuss the above-cited cases or
any of the
dceisions of the court::; of this state
>vith the fundamental
involved. It
quotes
scetion 339 of the HesLatrment of Torts
like the dissenting
in
48 Cal.2d
785 r312
P.2d 1089], equates its
with mere "lack of: due
care.'' Thus the main
upon the laudmvncr a
duty
the
child which is measured
prethe same standard as the
owed
thC' landowner
to a child \dlO
a business i1rdtee. The
of such
decisions in this state.
Cal.2c1 778; Mclnulcz
P.:2d 971] ;
56

don Y.
Polk v.

P.

.)
The reading of these authorities demonstrates the
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the landownrr toward the
eonvclltional terms
"laek of due
it ap1wars that thr landowner's

and then
addr>d burden of
ehildren from

situation i::;
that

the
!where a defendant who wail
~was
with some new aet of
ured pen;ou had entered the:·eon (Ycunauchi
703
P .~d
) , no authorities
whic·h hold that the ein·nmstanees of th•;
fall within its scope. An.v risk of harm
the leaving of the
in t1w
such leaving
' as distinguished from ''ac-tive
of the doetrine. Th0re is
fact to be determined whi\'11 could

supra,
the eonfusion
there.
of
to

that would
Sneh confusion will become worse confounded
the main
here. Both opinions m·c
the eom;truetion that this eonrt is now, sub
the former cases" as was advocated in

the
i 11e

v. J[aiscr
arc lilmwise
that this court uow, in
upon seetion 339 of the
135

no nw11tion '\Yhaten'r- is
of the
c·ase in the main
, the hf'neh and bar ~will stil1 be
npon this eonrt's Yiews
th<'
proper eonstnwtion of seet ion 389 of the Restat0m01lt of
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to whether
'forts
cases
As indicated in my dissent m Rc
pp.
106
P.2d
of the Hcstatem(•nt of
consistent with ''the former cases.''
supra, 48 Cal.2d 778; lJlel(
supNt, Cal.2d 741;
477.) Ou the other
in the
case or the maiil
be rcL:oneiled with those decision;;:. I am iu aecon] with Dean
Prosser's version of the proper eonstrudion of section
where he states: "'l'here are some
common in tlh:
which any child of sufficient age to be allowl'tl
may be expected to undC>rstand and
as the usual risks of fire and water, ... ''
on
2d
p. 441.) 'rlwre is no evid0nee in the record before us
which shows anything more than the "usual'' risk of fire.
it is not suggested that
more could be
shown on a retrial of the cause.
I ·would therefore reverse the judgment and would accompauy such reversal with directions to the trial eourt to enter
judgment in favor of the defendants.
Schauer, J., and McComb, ,J., coneurred.
CAHTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! agree with
that portion of the majority opinion whieh determiues the
issue of liability of the defendants in this ease lmt
with the discussion and the eondusion with rt>speet to the issue
of contributory negligence of the plaintiff, Donna Jean
Courtell.
From my examination of the reeord in this ease it appt>ars
dear that contributory negligenee i,; not an issue for the
following reasons: Pirst, there is no 1mffieient
in the answer of any of the defendants to raise an issue of
of any of the plaintiffs.
there is no basis for the conclusion that the issue of ,•outributory
is available to defendants ber•aw;e no
was offered on this issue and the ease was not tried upon the
that contributory
was an issue. The record
discloses that all of the testimony offered ou behalf of
tiff was testimony relating to hc•r conduet, whieh
necessarily a part of her ease in chief.
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above
it is not
to detc~rminc in this case ·whether the trial
discretion in
as a matter of law that
Donna
,Jean CourieU was not
of
care to avoid
the
encountered by her whieh resulted m
she eould not, therefore, be
of
rule, a defendant must
of the plaintiff in ord('I' to
v.
9

Bcck11cr,
v. Smrthern Pew. Co., 84
But where plaintiff'~;
gcnee appears from the allegations of the
or evidence introduced in his
the defense is available to the
defendant
not pleaded in his answer.
(Green v.
Southern rae. Co., 1:12 Cal. 254 [64 P. 2fi5]; Ilall
City &
San
188 Cal. 641 [206 P.
supra, 9 Cal.App. 350.) Another
rule 0xists where it appears from tlw record
the issue of contributory negligence was actually and
tried by the introduction of pertinent
is sho\\'11 that the parties
in sm·h trial
if the issue had been made
v.
88 Cal. 221, 227 [26 P.
49 Cal.2<1 397, 400-401
P.2d 1].)
set forth the fads on ·whieh the d(•fense of
is predicated and 11ot merely state
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C.2d

of
rrwth Chcrnnel Gold 1ilin.
"It is not necessary to use the
a concise s/alcmcnt of the
the connnission or omission
acts which tcould
similar c1:rcmnsiances in the exercise
which would appear to
conlrilmtc to the
must be
to

to exist it
very least

IS

at the
v.

180
~
Loitilo, 6 Cal.2d 363, 367
P.2d
), awl some cases have
held that a general demurrer should be sustained
v.
Habra, 126 Cal.App. 476, 47fl
P.2d 1055]; Callaway v.
128 Cal.App. 166, 16fl
P.2d
).
Applying these rules to the case at
the
for
determination is IYhether defendant's
in his second
special defense constitute an
of contributory
negligence. If not then the demurrer to this defense should
have been sustained or the motion to strike the same should
have been granted. .B'or the rea~ons stated below it appears
that the allegations contained in this pleading are insuffkie11t
to state a valid plea of contributory
The plea reads in part "That if in fact plaintiffs ... were
injured ... then said injuries and damages, if any . . . are
due to the negligence and careleGsness of the plaintiffs . . .
and that said negligence and carelessness . . .
and concurrently eontributed to and brought about whatevc•r
injuries and damages plaintiffs ... may have sustained.''
It is at once evident in reading this pleading that there are
no facts ineluded therein tLdt indicate the commission or
omission of acts \Yhieh 1vould be ref1nired of one under similar
cin:mnstances in the exereisc of
care and whieh
would appear to
contribute to the
of. Pailun: to
any faC't or fads from whi<:h the
gcnee oecmTecl renders the
nt fatal (Church v. Headrick & Brown, 101 Cal
; PotterY.
Richards, 1:32 Cal.App.2d 380
P.2d 113]) for thr reason
that there is a failure to show a causal conncetion between
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whiell
igent
w!Jen dcfl'mhnt
v Southern Pace
ae1

a (·ausnl

for

1ras denied 1\Iareh
the opinion that the petition

shou1(1 be

[h A. No. 25107. In Bank. Feb. 2, l9;)!J.]

I1EO D. lL\PT',

et al.,

[1] Public Officers-- Compensation- Increasing Compensation.Under Gov.
§ 53071,
the constitutioual proVlSIOn
increase of an
compensation after
his election or during· his term of
art. XI, \i 5)
·'time of war" and Gov. Code, § ;'53070,
"war"
as that
of time when
declares
or when
the armed forces of tlle United
power, ·whether or not
ending one year after
by the PresiJnn. '7, 19.);), declaring·
the termination of Korcnn hostilities aml
.Jnn. 31,
in the
195i5, as the date of termination of combatant
Korrnn conflict fulfllled the
of
constitutionnl awl ~tatntory
though
purpose >vas to iPnn innte certain veteran henPfits, the suspens-ion of the
salary iner<"flS('S tennjnated
on J
~n;ar after the presidPntial declaration of
tenniuation o[
and a eount:v salary onliuance of
DeePlnber 31, 19:i7,
the
of incumbent
e!ediYe offierrs of the county did nut lwcome Plfedive until
nl'trr tllcir tnms
on .January 5, 19;)9~

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Public
§ 174.
McK. Dig. Reference:
Public Oftlcers, § 110(1).

